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Who Decides and What Difference Does It Make?: 
Defining Marriage in “Our Democratic, Federal 
Republic” 
Kevin J. Worthen* 
Few issues of public and legal policy have captured more attention or 
generated more passion in the past decade than the legality of same-sex 
marriage. Literally hundreds of law review articles have been written on 
the topic.1 Judicial decisions seemingly indicating a favorable view to-
ward same-sex marriage have prompted a firestorm of legislative and 
constitutional activity in several states,2 and proponents and opponents 
 
This paper was presented at “The Future of Marriage and Claims for Same-Sex Unions Symposium” 
on August 29, 2003 at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, on the campus of Brigham Young Univer-
sity.  The article is part of this special symposium issue and the views expressed herein are those of 
the author and do not represent the views of the Journal of Public Law, the J. Reuben Clark Law 
School, or Brigham Young University. 
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. I 
thank Lynn Wardle, Bill Duncan, John Fee, Jim Rasband, and Cliff Fleming, as well as other par-
ticipants in the BYU law faculty work-in-progress session for helpful comments and insights, and 
Hutch Fale for valuable research assistance. 
 1. A search in the Westlaw database for the past ten years reveals over two-hundred articles 
whose titles contain the terms “same-sex marriage,” “civil union,” or “Defense of Marriage.” Three 
separate searches were performed, all limited to articles published after 1992. The first sought for 
articles whose titles included the term “same-sex marriage,” the second for articles whose titles in-
cluded the term “civil union” but not the term “same-sex marriage,” and the third for articles whose 
titles included “DOMA” or “Defense of Marriage.” There were 169 entries in the first category, 
twenty-six in the second, and thirty-four in the third. 
 2. The Hawaii Supreme Court decision in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), hold-
ing that the state constitution’s equal protection clause required that a statute restricting marriage to 
heterosexual couples be subjected to strict scrutiny, ultimately led to a state constitutional amend-
ment authorizing the legislature to “reserve marriage to opposite sex couples.” HAW. CONST. art. I, § 
23. See David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawai’i Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning and Fate, 
22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19 (2000) (detailing reaction to Baehr, culminating in constitutional amend-
ment). An Alaska Superior Court decision holding that the state must demonstrate a compelling in-
terest in order to justify refusal to issue a marriage license to same-sex couples, Brause v. Bureau of 
Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. 1998), prompted the passage of a state constitu-
tional amendment providing that “a marriage may exist only between one man and one woman.” 
ALASKA CONST. I, § 25. The Vermont Supreme Court held that denying same-sex couples the same 
benefits which were granted opposite-sex couples violated the state constitution, but deferred to the 
state legislature as to the means for remedying the violation. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 
1999). In response, the Vermont legislature enacted a civil union statute “reaffirming the limitation 
of marriage to opposite-sex couples, but granting all of the benefits of marriage to same-sex cou-
ples.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1212 (1989 & Supp. 2001). 
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anxiously await the results of court rulings in others.3 Numerous other 
states have not waited for judicial decisions, choosing to adopt legisla-
tion or constitutional amendments to address aspects of the issue before a 
court acts.4 The debate has been waged at the federal level as well. Con-
gress has enacted the Defense of Marriage Act,5 and the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s recent ruling in Lawrence v. Texas6 has been viewed by propo-
nents as a helpful building block in their efforts to legalize same-sex 
marriage,7 while at the same time prompting renewed efforts by oppo-
nents to adopt a federal constitutional amendment to thwart that effort.8 
Thus far the debate has centered largely on the substantive merits of 
the issue. This article does not. Instead, it seeks to draw attention to the 
perhaps equally important—but often overlooked—issue of the proper 
form and forum for resolving the substantive issue. It asks the question, 
if we awoke tomorrow to the newspaper headline—”Legality of Same-
Sex Marriage Decided”—what difference would it make if the succeed-
ing story referred to 1) a federal statute, 2) a U. S. Supreme Court deci-
sion, 3) a federal constitutional amendment, 4) a state statute, 5) a state 
supreme court decision, or 6) a state constitutional amendment? The arti-
cle attempts to answer that question in light of the structure of what I call 
“our democratic, federal, republican” form of government. 
The article proceeds in three parts. Section one considers the nature 
of the decision a government makes when it defines marriage, examining 
the various governmental interests in defining marriage which have been 
identified by proponents and opponents of legalizing same-sex marriage. 
 
 3. See, e.g., MichaelAnn Knotts, NJ Domestic Partner Act: Much Praise for the Law that 
Falls Short of Others, 13 N.J. Law.: Wkly. Newspaper 337 (Feb. 23. 2004); Mary P. Gallagheer et 
al., Charles Toutant, Henry Gottlieb and Michael Booth, Never Enough, 174 N.J.L.J. 1111 (Dec. 29, 
2003) (discussing pending appeal  from a New Jersey trial court’s ruling that the state’s refusal to 
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples did not violate the state constitution); Lewis v. Harris, 
No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 23191114 (N.J.Super.L. Nov 5, 2003). 
 4. See Mark Strasser, When Is a Parent Not a Parent? On DOMA, Civil Unions, and Pre-
sumptions of Parenthood, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 299, 305-07 (2001) (citing and analyzing state de-
fense of marriage acts). 
 5. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S. C. § 1738C; 
1 U.S.C. § 7). 
 6. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
 7. Joanna L. Grossman, Does Lawrence v. Texas “Change Everything?”, 10 THE GAY & 
LESBIAN REVIEW WORLDWIDE 4 (Sept. 1, 2003); Joseph N. Ducanto, Supreme Court Shows Winds 
Shifting on Gay Marriage, 26 CHI. LAW. 68 (Sept. 2003); Nancy Gibbs, A Yea for Gays, TIME, July 
7, 2003, at 38. The view that Lawrence will hasten the day in which same-sex marriage is legalized 
is not limited to same-sex marriage proponents. See, e.g., Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2498 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“This case ‘does not involve’ the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains 
the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court”). 
 8. Carolyn Lochhead, Foes of Gay Marriage Renew Push for a Ban, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, August 13, 2003, at A1; Michael J. McManus, Save Marriage in Court  . . . or Consti-
tution?, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Sept. 26, 2003, at A21. 
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Section two then describes the key components of “our democratic, fed-
eral republic,” highlighting both theoretical and practical reasons for the 
adoption of those components. Section three evaluates the relative merits 
of deciding the same-sex marriage issue in each of the six potential forms 
in terms of compatibility with the key components of “our” system of 
government, at the same time examining some practical effects of decid-
ing the issue in some of the forms. 
This analysis indicates that where and in what form the same-sex 
marriage debate is resolved has implications for both our current gov-
ernmental system and the long-term viability of the solution, whatever it 
may be. It also indicates that the best hypothetical newspaper story 
would begin with the phrase, “The state constitution was amended to-
day . . . .” 
I.  NATURE OF THE MARRIAGE DEFINITION DECISION 
In order to determine how and by whom the issue of same-sex mar-
riage should be resolved in our system of government, it is helpful as an 
initial matter to determine the nature of the decision being made. An in-
sight into this matter comes from a consideration of the interests a gov-
ernment (as opposed to individual actors)9 has in deciding what kinds of 
relationships will constitute a legal marriage.10 
Although courts and scholars have, over time, identified a large 
number of societal interests in having laws that distinguish and privilege 
“marriage” from other relationships, in a general sense those interests 
can be classified into four main categories:11 1) society’s interest in pro-
 
 9. As others have noted, when determining the government’s role in defining and regulating 
marriage, it is important to differentiate individual motivations for entering into a “marriage” rela-
tionship from societal interests in favoring and regulating such relationships. Martha Albertson 
Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 239, 243 (2001); Lynn Wardle, “Multiply and 
Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771, 777-79 (2001). 
 10. That the government has any interest in defining marriage is an issue which some dis-
pute. See Jacob Sundberg, Nordic Laws, in DAS ERBRECHT VON FAMILIEMANGEHORIGEN IN 
POSITIVRECHTLICHER UND RECHTSPOLITISCHER SICHT 40 (1971) (noting that a 1969 directive for 
reform of Swedish law specified that legislation should be drafted so as not to favor in any way the 
institution of marriage over other forms of cohabitation) cited in MARY ANN GLENDON, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
WESTERN EUROPE 15 (1989). 
 11. For some time after the creation of the United States, courts and others often articulated 
as a governmental interest in defining and regulating marriage the link between the proper form of 
marriage and the proper form of government. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 165-
66 (1878) (“According as monogamous or polygamous marriages are allowed, do we find the prin-
ciples on which the government of the people, to a greater or less extent rests. Professor Lieber says, 
polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle . . . which . . . fetters the people in stationary despotism, 
while that principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy”). See generally NANCY F. 
COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 9-131 (2000) (describing link 
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moting procreation and responsible child rearing,12 2) society’s interest 
in promoting a particular moral atmosphere,13 3) society’s interest in 
promoting the individual well-being of its members by facilitating the 
kinds of intimate relationships that provide individual fulfillment,14 and 
4) society’s interest in the equitable distribution of economic and other 
tangible benefits.15 The first set of interests focuses on the family as an 
organic unit and views marriage as a means of perpetuating society (both 
physically and culturally). The second set of interests focuses mainly on 
the sexual relationship itself and views marriage as a means of symboli-
cally reinforcing community norms concerning such matters. The third 
set of interests focuses on the individual, rather than the resulting unit,16 
 
between commitment to monogamous marriage and American political theory throughout the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries). However, as Professor Cott has indicated, the link between marriage 
and political theory and governance waned considerably beginning in the twentieth century, id. at 
157-58, to the point that there has been an “evaporation of the political role of marriage as ballast for 
the form of governance.” Id. at 213. Thus, this one-time well-established governmental interest in 
regulating marriage has largely been replaced in public discourse by the other interests. 
 12. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“Marriage and procreation are 
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The laws regarding marriage . . .  provide both when the sexual 
powers may be used and the legal and societal context in which children are born and brought up.”); 
Turney v. Avery, 113 A. 710, 710 (N.J. Ch. 1902) (“Lord Penzance has observed that the procrea-
tion of children is one of the ends of marriage. I do not hesitate to say that it is the most important 
object of matrimony, for without it the human race itself would perish from the earth.” (citations 
omitted)); COTT, supra note 11, at 5 (“No modern nation-state can ignore marriage forms, because 
of their direct impact on reproducing and composing the population.”). See generally Wardle, supra 
note 9, at 785-87. 
 13. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (“Marriage . . . [has] more to do with the mor-
als and civilization of a people than any other institution.”); E.J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? 
THE STRANGE SOCIAL HISTORY OF OUR MOST INTIMATE INSTITUTION 53 (1999) (“Marriage has 
long been seen as what makes sex legitimate—literally making it legal, roping it off from all those 
other kinds of sex for which an appalled neighborhood might haul you in front of the local ecclesias-
tical or county court.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987) (“[M]arriages . . . are expressions 
of emotional support and public commitment. These elements are an important and significant aspect 
of the marital relationship. In addition, . . . the commitment of marriage may be an exercise of reli-
gious faith as well as an expression of personal dedication.”); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 
619 (1984) (noting that constitutional protection afforded intimate associations such as marriage 
“reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties 
with others. Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards 
the ability independently to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (“[M]arital status often is a precondi-
tion to the receipt of government benefits (e.g., Social Security benefits), property rights (e.g., ten-
ancy by the entirety, inheritance rights), and other, less tangible benefits (e.g., legitimation of chil-
dren born out of wedlock).”); COTT, supra note 11, at 156-179 (describing ascendancy of 
government’s interest in economic impact of marriage). 
 16. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“[T]he marital couple is not an 
independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with 
a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.”); see also, Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Inter-
vention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835, 840 n.10 (1985) (noting “shift that [has] taken 
place from seeing the family as an organic group to seeing it as a contract among individuals”). 
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and views marriage as a means of promoting individual well-being and 
happiness. The fourth set of interests focuses on the benefits associated 
with the marriage status and views marriage as a means of facilitating the 
efficient and economic distribution of government or private benefits. 
While these views of marriage are not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive, one’s views on the proper definition depends, to a considerable ex-
tent, on one’s view as to which of these functions should be the primary 
function of marriage. Thus, opponents of same-sex marriage tend to em-
phasize the societal perpetuation function of marriage17—with its focus 
on responsible procreation—and on the sexual norm reinforcement func-
tion of marriage—with its focus on the proper form of sexual relations. 
Proponents of same-sex marriage tend to emphasize the individual ful-
fillment function of marriage—with its focus on individual benefits from 
long-term intimate relationships. Proponents of domestic partnership 
laws tend to emphasize the distributional function of marriage—with its 
focus on benefits.18 
The important point is that one cannot resolve the issue of which of 
these functions to prefer, how much weight to give them, or even how 
essential marriage is to the realization of the goal underlying the interest 
on value-neutral grounds. For example, one cannot decide how essential 
marriage is to responsible child rearing unless one first determines what 
values “children need.”19 This in turn requires some consideration of 
what values society favors. Similarly, one cannot decide how well mar-
riage reinforces proper sexual norms unless one first determines what 
sexual norms are proper, an extremely value-contingent decision. Nor 
can one decide how essential marriage is to individual well-being unless 
one first determines what constitutes individual well-being and fulfill-
ment, a determination which requires a prior decision as to what values 
society favors. Finally, and most importantly, one cannot begin to bal-
ance the various factors without further making the value choice as to 
which of the competing values (to the extent they conflict) should be pre-
ferred. 
In short, when government defines marriage it necessarily deter-
mines, or reflects, to a considerable extent, its moral vision of what is 
 
 17. Wardle, supra note 9, at 785 (“the history of marriage regulation itself could be viewed 
primarily as the history of the regulation of sex, procreation, and child rearing, for those concerns 
have long outweighed such modern (and postmodern) interests as romantic love, companionate 
equality, interspousal intimacy, and economic maximization as the core societal concerns regarding 
marriage”). 
 18. See, e.g., Nancy K. Kubasek, Kara Jennings, Shannon T. Browne, Fashioning a Toler-
able Domestic Partners Statute in an Environment Hostile to Same-Sex Marriages, 7 L. & 
SEXUALITY 55 (1997). 
 19. Ann Dailey, Federalism and Family Law, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1869 (1995). 
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good for society and individuals. As Professor Fineman put it, “our be-
liefs about marriage help to shape our understandings of other societal 
institutions”20—or, one might add, vice-versa. 
The marriage definition debate is, therefore, an extremely value-
laden decision dependent on one’s moral vision of what values are most 
important. The key question for this article is how such decisions are best 
made in our system of government. That in turn requires an examination 
of what “our” system of government is, and on what values it is based. 
II.  “OUR FEDERAL, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC” 
In order to understand the manner in which value choices are best 
made in “our” system of government, it is helpful to note that one of the 
primary purposes of that system—a purpose evident from both the struc-
ture of the system and the history of its framing—is to prevent tyranny,21 
and that one form of tyranny that the system is designed to prevent is that 
which exists when a king or other government entity controls the crea-
tion and transmission of all value and moral judgments and imposes 
them on the governed.22 However, even though the framers of our system 
agreed on the need to eliminate this—and other forms—of tyranny, they 
were far from unanimous about how that could best be accomplished. 
A major source of disagreement on this matter stemmed from a fun-
damental difference of opinion concerning basic political philosophy. On 
one side of the divide were those who believed in “classic liberalism”—a 
key postulate of which is that government should have little or no role in 
 
 20. Fineman, supra note 9, at 247. See also  Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 ([M]arriage 
has “more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution.”); Noel v. 
Ewing, 9 Ind. 36, 48 (1857) ([M]arriage “is pre-eminently the basis of civil institutions, and thus an 
object of the deepest public concern . . . . It is a great public institution, giving character to our whole 
civil polity.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Terri Peretti, A Normative Appraisal of Social Scientific Knowledge Regarding 
Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 358 (2003) (“It is commonplace to observe that the 
framers, in designing the Constitution, were strongly motivated by a fear of tyranny, particularly a 
majority tyranny that would likely develop in a democratic system.”). Speaking of the framers, 
Marci Hamilton has observed: “There was broad consensus on the end to be avoided—tyranny from 
any social center of power. The Framers typically focused on the choice of the best means to avoid 
tyranny.” Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. REV. 
807, 811 (1999). 
 22. “Monolithic control of the value transmission system is ‘a hallmark of totalitarianism.’” 
Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy—Balancing the 
Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 480 (1983) (quoting P. BERGER & R. 
NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER THE PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 44 
(1977). Speaking of the purpose of the Establishment Clause, which prevents governmental inter-
mingling with religion, Michael McConnell noted a similar concern about this form of tyranny. 
“Churches, synagogues, and other religious organizations were (and to a great extent still are) the 
leading institutions for the formation and dissemination of values and opinions. That is too important 
a function to be subjected to centralized political control.” Michael McConnell, Governments, Fami-
lies, and Power: A Defense of Educational Choice, 31 CONN. L. REV. 847, 848 (1999). 
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determining what constitutes the good for individuals and society. Under 
this view, government should, to the extent possible, be “value-neutral;” 
its proper role is to provide a process by which individuals can determine 
for themselves, both individually and in concert with other private actors, 
what values and morals are best.23 According to the tenets of classic lib-
eralism, the best way to prevent the form of tyranny in which an outside 
government makes and imposes value choices on the governed is to limit 
the power of government to make such choices. 
On the other side of the divide were those who adhered to the “clas-
sic republicanism” political philosophy, the key postulate of which is that 
the purpose of government is to bring individuals together to determine 
and implement shared moral principles.24 Under this view, government is 
not to be value neutral; to the contrary, its central purpose is to ensure 
that proper values are constructed, shaped, and disseminated throughout 
society because, according to this philosophy, only a society with proper 
values can remain free from tyranny.25 These two competing philoso-
 
 23. As Richard Stewart explained, “Liberal theory affirms the equal right and opportunity of 
each individual to pursue her own conception of the good. Government aids this enterprise by secur-
ing individuals’ private and political liberties, underwriting private agreements and associations, and 
providing other nurturing social services (such as education) and other collective goods (such as 
healthy environments).” Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-
Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1539 (1983). Thus, under the classic liberal view, “govern-
ment must strive to remain neutral among competing conceptions of the good, while simultaneously 
securing the capacity of individuals and associations to realize their chosen ends.” Id. 
 24. Daniel Elazar describes these two “contrasting conceptions of the political order” as one 
(liberalism) in which “the political order is conceived as a market place in which the primary public 
relationships are the product of bargaining among [private] individuals and groups,” and one (classic 
republicanism) in which “the political order is conceived to be a commonwealth—a state in which 
the whole people have an undivided interest—in which the citizens cooperate in an effort to create 
and maintain the best government in order to implement certain shared moral principles.” DANIEL J. 
ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 172 (1988). See also, Suzanne Sherry, Civic 
Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 551 (1986) 
(“Where liberalism finds the primary purpose of government to be promotion of the diverse goods of 
individual citizens, republicanism finds its primary purpose to be definition of community values 
and creation of the public and private virtue necessary for societal achievement of those values”). 
 25. The concern of classic republicans was summed up by the views of one writer of the time 
who noted that when virtue declined, citizens would no longer vigilantly watch over their freedom 
and government would become tyrannical. “Thus, before a nation is completely deprived of free-
dom, she must be fitted for slavery by her vices.” GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 52-53 (1969) (quoting William Tudor, An Oration Delivered at 
Boston, March 5, 1779, in PRINCIPLES AND ACTS OF THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 57 (Hezekiah 
Niles ed., 1876)). As Gordon Wood explained it, the belief was that “[r]epublics died not from inva-
sions from without but from decay from within.” Id. at 53. 
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phies were much in play at the time of the framing26 and pointed toward 
two different solutions to the tyranny problem.27 
In a general sense, the classic liberal view—under which govern-
ment’s role was not to determine what was good for individuals or soci-
ety, but rather to facilitate the process by which private individuals and 
private groups determine those issues for themselves—prevailed in the 
federal constitution.28 The focus of that document is on process, specifi-
cally on the structures and processes through which governmental deci-
sions are made at a national level.29 Thus, the federal constitution is, by 
and large,30 devoid of any express31 value or moral judgments. Instead, it 
reflects the view expressed in a central provision of the Declaration of 
Independence that “governments are instituted among men,” not to de-
termine for its citizens what constitutes happiness, but to “secure” their 
right to pursue that goal according to their own vision of it.32 
Recognizing that no government can exist or function without the 
creation and implementation of some values, however, the framers in-
serted several structural defenses into the national system which were de-
signed to prevent the kind of tyranny that can result when some entity 
becomes the disproportionate source of value judgments and opinions. 
 
 26. Gordon Wood has asserted that the classic republicanism that fueled the revolution was 
eclipsed by classic liberalism when the U.S. constitution was adopted. Id. at 608-12. 
 27. In a general sense, the liberal solution was to keep government out of the value selection 
process, while the republican solution was to make sure that the people remained in control of the 
government, whose role was to make sure the right values were chosen. 
 28. As Daniel Elazar explained, “[w]ere the federal constitution to stand alone, one could 
conclude that morality and government were entirely separated in the new American constitutional 
order.” ELAZAR, supra note 24, at 169. It is clear, however, that supporters of the federal constitution 
believed that the constitution reflected some of the of the fundamental principles of classic republi-
canism. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“Republican government presupposes the existence of [qualities of human nature reflecting virtue] 
in a higher degree than any other form”). Indeed, as Akhil Amar has pointed out, portions of the fed-
eral constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, also arguably reflect civic republicanism norms. See 
Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991). See also infra note 36. 
 29. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 88-
101 (1980). 
 30. There are, of course, some exceptions to this. See id. at 92-93. As Ely also noted, how-
ever, the two most notable exceptions in the subsequent amendments (the Thirteenth outlawing slav-
ery and the Eighteenth adopting prohibition) are the exceptions that prove the rule. Id. at 99. The 
lessons to be learned from the prohibition “exception” are discussed below. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 90-104. Insights from the slavery experience are discussed infra at note 110. 
 31. Of course, “[l]ike every legal and political theory, [the theory of liberalism] rests on po-
tentially controversial value choices. Its premise is that the ultimate good for men and women is plu-
ral and can be realized only by voluntary efforts, both individual and concerted.” Stewart, supra note 
23, at 1539. 
 32. ELY, supra note 29, at 89-90. As Ely explains, this and other “critical constitutional 
documents” consistently portray the theme that “justice and happiness are best assured not by trying 
to define them for all time, but rather by attending to the governmental processes by which their di-
mensions would be specified over time.” Id. at 89. 
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Four of these features are of particular relevance to an understanding of 
our system of government. 
First, and preeminent in the minds of many at the time of the fram-
ing, is the democratic notion of popular sovereignty,33 which put the 
people who were to be governed (instead of some outside force such as a 
king) as the ultimate source of whatever value judgments the national 
government would adopt. It was “the people”34—not a king or the nation 
state—who ordained and established the constitution, one of the purposes 
of which was to “secure the Blessings of Liberty”—the polar opposite of 
tyranny—to themselves and to their posterity.35 By eliminating the dis-
tinction between the sovereign and the governed, this “democratic” fea-
ture of our government diminished the chances that outside values and 
judgments would be imposed by the 
government.36 
Two other structural tyranny defenses compose what I call the fed-
eral component of our system. The first is the division of the people’s 
sovereign powers—initially between state and federal governments, and 
then among the three branches of government (at least at the national 
level). This dual division of delegated powers, Madison argued, provided 
a “double security” against the tendency toward all forms of tyranny that 
might occur if one entity controlled all governmental power.37 
 
 33. See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Conflicts of Interest and the Constitution, 59 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 713, 733 (2002) (“[T]he Framers of the Constitution incorporated a novel, critical feature to 
further protect liberty from governmental tyranny. They vested governmental authority in the peo-
ple.”). For further authority, see id. at n.95. 
 34. As Madison put it in The Federalist, “the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and 
ratification of the people of America” who are “the supreme authority.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 
243 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 35. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 36. This feature of the federal constitution is completely consistent with classic republican-
ism as well. As Thomas Paine, a chief proponent of classic republicanism, explained, “the word re-
public means the public good or the good of the whole in contradistinction to the despotic form 
which makes the good of the sovereign or of one man, the only object of the government.” WOOD, 
supra note 25, at 55-56. Thus, even under the classic republican view, keeping people involved and 
in control of the system is a key component of the battle against tyranny. Classic republicanism in-
structed that “any government which lacked ‘a proper representation of the people’ or was in any 
way even ‘independent of the people’ was liable to violate the common good and become tyranni-
cal.” Id. at 56 (quoting Samuel West, A Sermon Preached . . . May 29th, 1776, Being the Anniver-
sary for the Election of the Honorable Council for the Colony, in THE PULPIT OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION: OR, THE POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE PERIOD OF 1776 280-81 (John W. Thornton. 
ed., 1860). 
 37. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“In the 
compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two 
distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate 
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.”). 
Although we have come to think of only the first of these divisions as the “federal” component of 
our system—referring to the other as separation of powers—in this article, I use the term “federal” to 
refer to both vertical and horizontal separation of powers, as well as to the limited nature of national 
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A second structural “federalist” defense mechanism against tyranny 
was the decision to limit the kinds of issues the national government 
could address.38 That government was to exercise authority “principally 
on external objects” such as “war, peace, negotiation, and foreign com-
merce.”39 While value choices inevitably are involved in such matters—
as they are on any other governmental decision40—the federal govern-
ment was not to have control over governmental decisions affecting the 
more personal value choices “which, in the ordinary course of affairs, 
concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people.”41 Thus, the lim-
ited nature of the national government is a prominent part of the federal 
component of “our” government system. 
The final tyranny-combating component of the federal constitutional 
structure of “our” system of government is its republican nature. In the 
national system, the value-laden decisions that must be made are made, 
by and large, by elected representatives in Congress, rather than directly 
by the people. This feature, coupled with the bicameral nature of the leg-
islature42 and the provision for executive veto,43 provides an additional 
check on undue governmental control over values by providing filters 
through which the value choices must pass before they become law.44 
 
governmental powers, which is a part of the more traditional federal definition. This expanded defi-
nition of the term—though certainly awkward and potentially misleading—is not as contrived as 
might at first appear. A federal system is one in which the sovereignty is divided among more than 
one government. The division of power among the three branches is also a division of sovereignty. 
More importantly, the framers clearly viewed the two concepts as related, at least insofar as they 
worked in tandem to prevent tyrannical use of the sovereign power. See id. The framers noted that 
the same principle explained, in part, the decision to further divide sovereign power in the legislative 
branch through adoption of a bicameral system. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378-379 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[A] senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly 
distinct from and dividing the power with a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the gov-
ernment. It doubles the security to the people by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in 
schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be suffi-
cient.”). 
 38. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and de-
fined.”). 
 39. Id. 
 40. When, for example, Congress decides to provide tax benefits to married couples, it makes 
a value choice as to the desirability of that condition. Even more seemingly value-neutral choices, 
such as the decision to use an income tax, rather than some other form of taxation, or even the deci-
sion to use taxation—rather than government-owned enterprises—to generate revenue for the gov-
ernment, necessarily involve value choices. 
 41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 293 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 44. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(the principle of representation serves to “to refine and enlarge the public views by passing them 
through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest 
of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to tempo-
rary or partial considerations.”). See generally Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sov-
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Therefore, in a republic such as ours, the inflamed passion of the major-
ity, which controversial value decisions often engender, is less likely to 
find its way into governmental policy. 
Thus, consistent with the theory of classic liberalism which it largely 
reflects, the principal remedy for tyranny adopted at the national level is 
the structure of “our” government: a democratic (with the people as sov-
ereign), federal (with the dual division of sovereignty and the limited na-
ture of federal power) republic (with elected representatives acting in a 
bicameral legislature subject to executive veto power). That kind of 
structural remedy is largely consistent with the liberal view that govern-
mental structure should focus on process rather than substantive results. 
Yet there is one feature of the original federal constitution which in-
dicates that the victory of classic liberalism over its republican competi-
tor was not complete and that the way in which tyranny is to be com-
bated in our system is more complex than at first appears. Had the 
framers adopted wholeheartedly the liberal view that government should, 
to the fullest extent possible, be wholly removed from all value judg-
ments, one would have expected provisions in the constitution that would 
have prevented not only the federal, but also the state, governments from 
making such judgments. In the absence of an express direction to that ef-
fect, one would have at least expected that—given Madison’s view that 
tyranny was more likely to occur in small republics (like states)45 and 
that the best remedy for this was to resolve controversial decisions at a 
national level46—proponents of classic liberalism would have insisted 
that Congress, rather than the states, be given whatever governmental 
powers were appropriate to regulate morals. Yet, stating what was the 
inevitable consequence of the limited nature of federal powers, the Tenth 
Amendment made clear that the police power, with its accompanying au-
thority to regulate morals, was left to the “states.”47 
 
ereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-03 
(2003). 
 45. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 46. Madison believed that, at a national level, factions which sought to impose value judg-
ments on others were more likely to cancel each other out and that the other legislative filters which 
existed at the national level would further limit the number of value-judgments which would make 
their way into law.  Id. 
 47. U.S. CONST. amend. X. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566-67 (1995) 
(finding that the Constitution withholds from Congress the “general police power of the sort retained 
by the States”); United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895) (“[T]he power of a state to 
protect the lives, health, and property of its citizens, and to preserve good order and the public mor-
als, ‘the power to govern men and things within the limits of its dominion,’ is a power originally and 
always belonging to the states, not surrendered by them to the general government, nor directly re-
strained by the constitution of the United States, and essentially exclusive.”); G. ALAN TARR, 
UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 7-8 (1998). 
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This decision appears especially incongruous with the remainder of 
the classic liberal  orientation of the federal constitution when one real-
izes that the state constitutions at the time reflected much more the clas-
sic republican view that government’s role was not to remain neutral on 
moral issues, but instead to act at the direction of its citizens to determine 
and “implement shared moral principles.”48 For example, whereas the 
federal constitution mandated government neutrality on religious mat-
ters,49 the contemporaneous Massachusetts provision unabashedly de-
clared that “the happiness of a people . . . essentially depend[s] upon pi-
ety, religion and morality” and authorized the legislature to require local 
governments “to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for the 
institution of public worship of God, and for the support and mainte-
nance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion and morality, in all 
cases where such provision shall not be voluntary.”50 Moreover, while 
the federal constitution made clear that Congress had only the powers 
delegated to it by the federal constitution, prevailing doctrine then and 
now posits that state legislatures have inherent authority to regulate any 
subject—including morals—not expressly placed off-limits by the state 
or federal constitutions.51 
Thus, the kind of value-laden moral decisions that liberal political 
philosophy seemed to abhor and which the federal constitution seemed to 
avoid—and discourage—at the national level were expressly permitted, 
and even encouraged, at the state level. While carefully limiting opportu-
nities for the national government to make moral judgments in order to 
prevent tyranny, the framers choose to, by and large, leave the states free 
from constraint. How can one explain this incongruity? 
Undoubtedly, some of it may be explained by the political reality 
that the national constitution would not have been adopted if it were 
 
 48. ELAZAR, supra note 24, at 172. See e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. VI (2003) (As morality 
and piety, rightly grounded on high principles, will give the best and greatest security to government, 
and will lay, in the hearts of men, the strongest obligations to due subjection; and as the knowledge 
of these is most likely to be propagated through a society, therefore, the several parishes . . . shall at 
all times have the right of electing their own teachers . . . .”); VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 
15 (“no free government, or the blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a firm 
adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue”). 
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 50. MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. III. See also VA. CONST. of 1776, art. I, §§ 5 & 16 (admon-
ishing citizens to treat others with “Christian forbearance, love, and charity”). 
 51. See, e.g., In the Interest of B.D., 720 So.2d 476, 478-79 (Miss. 1998) (“In decisions too 
numerous to mention, it is firmly established that the legislature has the inherent authority as an in-
cident to the police power of the state, subject to constitutional limitations, to prescribe laws and 
regulations for the purpose of safeguarding the health, safety and morals of the inhabitants of the 
state.”). For this reason, while the federal constitution is generally viewed as a grant of authority to 
Congress, state constitutions are generally construed as limits on legislative authority, with the pre-
sumption that, unless so limited, state legislatures have plenary power. See State ex rel. Schneider v. 
Kennedy, 587 P.2d 844, 850 (Kan. 1978); TARR, supra note 47, at 7. 
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viewed as too disruptive of the prior status quo and prevailing philoso-
phy, and at least some of the framers who believed strongly in the liberal 
political philosophy may have been willing to go along with less than a 
perfect solution in order to achieve one that was better than the existing 
state of things. However, at least some of the framers also understood 
that there were legitimate reasons why one might conclude that liberty 
would be better served by allowing states this leeway, even under a clas-
sic liberal view of government. 
First, Madison’s views notwithstanding,52 it is not entirely clear that 
giving the police powers to the national government would have made 
their exercise any less of a threat to liberty, even with all the extra proce-
dural filters that the constitution provided for legislative decisions at the 
national level. Indeed, granting Congress the police powers may have 
made those powers more dangerous by separating the value-shaping 
power more from the people who were to control it under the notion of 
popular sovereignty.53 For many, the concern that the government agents 
would themselves be unfaithful to their trust and impose their values on 
the governed was a real threat,54 and one more likely to occur if the 
agents were not intimately connected with the governed as they were at a 
local level.55 
Second, even if, contrary to this view (and more consistent with 
Madison’s belief), oppressive use of legislative power is more likely to 
occur at the state rather than the national level, the harmful effects of 
such “bad” decisions are in one sense less at the local level because, as 
Michael McConnell has pointed out, “[o]ppressive measures at the state 
level are easier to avoid.”56 By moving to a different state, one can avoid 
 
 52. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 53. Contrary to the claim of their opponents, the largely classic republican anti-federalists did 
not lack trust in the people to govern themselves, they simply thought the actual decision-makers 
were too far removed from the people under the proposed federal constitution. See WOOD, supra 
note 25, at 520. 
 54. Id. at 559, 598, 608; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison). 
 55. WOOD, supra note 25, at 520-21 (noting that Antifederalists were not anti-democratic, 
but “‘localists,’ fearful of distant governmental, even representational, authority” who argued that 
liberty would be lost because power was placed “into the hands of a set of men who live one thou-
sand miles from you”) (quoting 2 THE LETTERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE 451-52 (James C. Ballagh 
ed., 1911)). Early state legislatures had greatest power among state governmental officials (consid-
erably more than they did at the federal level, especially in early constitutions, see G. Alan Tarr, Be-
tween Authority and Liberty: State Constitution Making in Revolutionary America, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 
865, 869 (1997) (book review); Rogan Kersh et al., “More a Distinction of Words than Things”: The 
Evolution of Separated Powers in the American States, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 5, 16-17 
(1998)) precisely because they were more representative of the people. WOOD, supra note 25, at 163 
(“[T]he real importance of the legislatures came from their being the constitutional repository of the 
democratic element of the society or, in other words, the people themselves”). 
 56. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1484, 1503 (1987) (book review). 
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moral choices with which one does not agree without relinquishing all 
the benefits of national citizenship, a form of exit not possible if moral 
decisions are made at the national level.57 
Third, requiring that the moral decisions that government makes be 
made at the state rather than the national level provides individuals with 
a greater choice of moral atmospheres to which to attach themselves, 
thereby enhancing, in one sense, the liberty of all citizens of the nation to 
choose their own moral values.58 
Finally, and most importantly for purposes of this article, cognizant 
of the ideals of classic republicanism, at least some of the framers un-
doubtedly understood that there were some aspects of that philosophy 
that were helpful, perhaps essential, to the avoidance of tyranny in any 
system of democratic government, even one largely oriented to a classic 
liberal philosophy. They realized that tyranny in a democracy can arise 
from a number of causes,59 including as a result of citizen alienation from 
government. When citizens are alienated from the government, tyranny 
can result in at least two ways, each of which is countered to some extent 
by the classic republican view that citizens ought to work together to cre-
ate and implement a shared vision of the good. 
 
 57. Moreover, as Michael McConnell has noted, in some situations, allowing moral decisions 
to be made at the state level can decrease the number of people who will feel oppressed by the deci-
sions that are made. 
For example, assume that there are only two states, with equal populations of 100 each. Assume fur-
ther that 70 percent of State A, and only 40 percent of State B, wish to outlaw smoking in public 
buildings. The others are opposed. If the decision is made on a national basis by a majority rule, 110 
people will be pleased, and 90 displeased. If a separate decision is made by majorities in each state, 
130 will be pleased, and only 70 displeased. The level of satisfaction will be still greater if some 
smokers in State A decide to move to State B, and some anti-smokers in State B decide to move to 
State A. Id. at 1494. 
 58. As Michael McConnell has explained: 
Under a regime of decentralized decision making, it is more, not less, likely that commu-
nities will adopt a radical, controversial from of social organization. Santa Monica, Cali-
fornia, for example, can adopt a form of socialism that is unlikely to command majority 
support in any state or the nation at large. To some, Santa Monica will be a beacon of (a 
particular form of) liberty; to others, it is a petty tyranny. Indianapolis can (or could, if 
the courts would allow it) adopt anti-pornography legislation more stringent than national 
norms. To some (a curious alliance of feminists and social conservatives) this protects 
their freedom from a pornography-ridden society; to others, this is a violation of freedom 
of expression. The liberty that is protected by federalism is not the liberty of the apodictic 
solution, but the liberty that comes from diversity coupled with mobility. 
Id. at 1503-04. 
 59. Madison, for example, believed that tyranny could result from either “the ‘oppression of 
[the] rulers’” or “the ‘injustice’ of ‘one part of the society against . . . the other part.’” McConnell, 
supra note 56, at 1504 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See 
also Michael A. Scaperlanda, In Defense of Representative Democracy, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 38, 41-42 
(2001) (noting framers’ belief that factional tyranny “can arise from three sources in society: (1) by a 
minority of the populace; (2) through an abuse of power by those chosen to govern . . . ; or (3) by a 
majority of the populace”). 
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The first form of tyranny potentially resulting from citizen alienation 
arises as a result of all governments’ need to enforce their laws. Gener-
ally speaking, obedience to law can come from either fear of punishment 
or voluntary compliance.60 If a government must rely primarily on the 
former, it may well evolve into a tyrannical police state, as it is forced to 
place law enforcement officers in every location of possible violation. 
Thus, as the anti-federalist Brutus explained, in a free (non-tyrannical) 
society “the government must rest for its support upon the confidence 
and respect which the people have for their government and laws,”61 and 
not on fear of punishment. This attitude of voluntary obedience requires 
some subordination of the individual will to the common good, one of 
the central values classic republicanism sought to instill in its citizens.62 
Moreover, the confidence in government which contributed to such an 
attitude is facilitated by the more intimate acquaintance that exists be-
tween a citizen and her state or local representative than between her and 
her Senator.63 Therefore, when moral decisions are made at a national 
level, there will likely be less voluntary compliance and, given govern-
ment’s inevitable desire to enforce its laws, a corresponding tendency for 
the government to rely on oppressive law enforcement efforts.64 
Second, precluding government from acting at a local level on issues 
of greatest concern to citizens could result in a diminishment of public or 
civic virtue, the kind of attitude which arguably allows any kind of free 
democratic system to operate.65 Classic republicanism postulated that 
 
 60. McConnell, supra note 56, at 1508. 
 61. Id. (quoting 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 2.9.18 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)). 
See also WOOD, supra note 25, at 66 (“In a free government the laws, as the American clergy [in the 
late eighteenth century] never tired of repeating, had to be obeyed by the people for conscience’s 
sake, not for wrath’s.”). 
 62. WOOD, supra note 25, at 53 (“The sacrifice of individual interests to the greater good of 
the whole formed the essence of republicanism.”). 
 63. As Brutus put it, 
The different parts of so extensive a country could not possibly be made acquainted with 
the conduct of their representatives, nor be informed of the reasons upon which measures 
were founded. The consequence will be, they will have not confidence in their legislature, 
suspect them of ambitious views, be jealous of every measure they adopt, and will not 
support the laws they pass. 
McConnell, supra note 56, at 1508 (quoting 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 2.9.18 (Herbert J. 
Storing ed., 1981)). “The confidence which the people have in their rulers, in a free republic arises 
from their knowing them, from their being responsible to them for their conduct, and from the power 
they have of displacing them when they misbehave.” Id. 
 64. See discussion concerning prohibition infra text accompanying notes 90-104. 
 65. As Gordon Wood explained, classic republicans believed that “[a]lthough a particular 
structural arrangement of the government in a republic might temper the necessity for public virtue, 
ultimately ‘no model of government whatever can equal the importance of this principle [of public 
or civic virtue], nor afford proper safety and security without it.” WOOD, supra note 25, at 68 (quot-
ing Phillips Payson, A Sermon Preached . . . at Boston, May 27, 1778, in THE PULPIT OF THE 
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citizens could maintain their freedom in a democratic form of govern-
ment only if they were willing to fully engage in the process and as a re-
sult, be more willing to subordinate their well-being to the common 
good.66 This kind of attitude is much easier to cultivate at a local level, 
where participation is easier and the ties that make such sacrifices possi-
ble more likely exist.67 More importantly, classic republicans believed, 
this attitude of public virtue could be cultivated only if proper private vir-
tues were inculcated in the citizenry;68 hence the need for governments, 
particularly more local ones, to have some say in the overall moral at-
mosphere of the community. In the absence of such public virtue—which 
could result from citizen alienation from the governmental system—the 
national democratic system would arguably eventually evolve into a ty-
rannical state because the ultimate sovereignty of the people would di-
minish through lack of interest and involvement in the system.69 
Classic republicanism thereby provided the antidote to the two forms 
of tyranny (that arising from lack of adequate voluntary obedience to law 
and that arising from lack of adequate public virtue in the citizenry) that 
could result from citizen alienation from the government. Thus, the vi-
ability of the liberal individualistic political philosophy reflected in the 
federal constitution was arguably dependent to a considerable extent on 
the preservation of some aspects of the civic republican philosophy re-
 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: OR, THE POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE PERIOD OF 1776 337 (Thornton ed., 
1860)). 
 66. See supra note 62. 
 67. As McConnell explains, “[a]n individual is most likely to sacrifice his private interest for 
the good of his family, and then for his neighbors and, by extension, his community. He is unlikely 
to place great weight upon the well-being of strangers hundreds of miles away.” McConnell, supra 
note 56, at 1510. 
 68. As Wood explains, “public virtue, the willingness of the people to surrender all, even 
their lives, for the good of the state, was primarily the consequence of men’s individual private vir-
tues. . . . A man raked by the selfish passions of greed, envy, and hate” would not possess public 
virtue. WOOD, supra note 25, at 69. 
 69. Tocqueville described well the state of affairs that could result from such citizen alien-
ation from government. 
[T]he citizen is unconcerned as to the condition of his village, the police of his street, the 
repairs of the church or of the parsonage; for he looks upon all these things as uncon-
nected with himself, and as the property of a powerful stranger whom he calls the Gov-
ernment. He has only a life-interest in these possessions, and he entertains no notions of 
ownership or of improvement. This want of interest in his own affairs goes so far that, if 
his own safety or that of his children is endangered, instead of trying to avert the peril, he 
will fold his arms, and wait till the nation comes to his assistance. This same individual, 
who has so completely sacrificed his own free will has no natural propensity to obedi-
ence; he cowers, it is true before the pettiest officer; but he braves the law with the spirit 
of a conquered foe as soon as its superior force is removed: his oscillations between ser-
vitude and license are perpetual. When a nation has arrived at this state it must either 
change its customs and its laws or perish; the source of public virtue is dry, and, though it 
may contain subjects, the race of citizens is extinct. 
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 94 (Henry Reeve trans., 1961). 
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flected in the state constitutions of the time,70 and one can accurately de-
scribe our system of government as a democratic, federal republic only if 
one understands that the term “republic” connotes not only the notion 
that contested value judgments are to be made by elected representatives, 
but also that the system is imbued with the anti-alienation features of 
classic republicanism which the framers arguably viewed as essential to 
the existence of a non-tyrannical state.71 
In sum, there are three essential components (two of which have sub-
components) of “our” system of government: 1) it is democratic (the 
people are the sovereign), 2) it is federal (in that it both divides power 
vertically and horizontally and limits the subjects over which the national 
government has jurisdiction), and 3) it is republican (in both the sense 
that it is a representative, rather than a purely democratic, form of gov-
ernment and in the sense that it is imbued with the anti-alienation fea-
tures of classical republicanism).72 
 
 70. As Daniel Elazar put it: “It is not unfair to say that the federal constitution could empha-
size individualism and the market place precisely because the founders could count upon the state 
constitutions to emphasize the community and commonwealth.” ELAZAR, supra note 24, at 169. 
While several scholars have concluded that early state constitutions differed fundamentally from 
their federal counterpart by adopting a more civic republicanism point of view, others have asserted 
that there was less distance between liberalism and civic republicanism at the time. See TARR, supra 
note 47, at 64 & nn.15 & 16 (citing sources). 
 71. It was in reference to the latter meaning of the term that Thomas Paine observed, “What 
is called a republic is not any particular form of government.” WOOD, supra note 25, at 47. 
 72. One might challenge this analysis as incomplete because it does not take into account the 
changes to “our system of government” brought about by the Civil War Amendments, and particu-
larly the Fourteenth Amendment. There is no doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment changed the 
balance between state and federal power significantly—indeed, that was the entire point of the 
amendment. Furthermore, there is no doubt that once the amendment was ratified, states had less 
leeway to shape the moral vision of their political communities than they did before the amendment, 
as constitutional limits were placed on the use of the police power that did not exist before. The 
amendment as a whole, as Akhil Amar has said about the privileges and immunities clause, “indi-
cates a subtle, but real shift of emphasis, reflecting a vision more liberal than republican, more indi-
vidualistic than collectivist, more private than public.” Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1261 (1992). 
While this shift in emphasis was real, it does not alter the basic nature of the system described above, 
in my view. The limitations placed on the states, while of real significance, did not signal, nor re-
quire complete abandonment of the classic republican philosophy—which still prevailed to some 
extent. The police powers were not divested from the states, and few (other than Justice Black) argue 
that all limitations imposed on the federal government, now apply to the states’ use of those powers. 
Indeed, scholars like Akhil Amar have shown that several provisions of the Bill of Rights were 
themselves designed in large part to protect state sovereignty (and not just individual rights) and that 
those provisions which had that effect should not be applied to the states (or at least not in the same 
manner as they are to the federal government). See, e.g., AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 215-283 (1998). Thus, while the amendment clearly indicates that 
there are certain “moral” visions a state cannot adopt, it does not indicate they are precluded from 
adopting any moral vision. There is, therefore, still ample leeway for state citizens to work in a re-
publican way if they choose to do so, and—given the anti-alienation benefits of the republican phi-
losophy—good reason for them to do so. 
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With an understanding of both the value-laden nature of the marriage 
definition decision and the key components of “our democratic, federal, 
republican” system of government, it is possible to consider the question 
raised at the outset: given the nature of the decision and “our” system of 
government, by whom, and in what form should the same-sex marriage 
issue be resolved? 
III.  DEFINING MARRIAGE IN “OUR DEMOCRATIC, FEDERAL REPUBLIC” 
As noted above, there are six different forms in which the same-sex 
marriage issue could be resolved. An analysis of the objections that 
might be raised by a proponent of “our” system of government against a 
decision in each of these forms shows that the decision is best made via a 
“properly-adopted” state constitution and that resolution of the issue in 
other forms will, to varying degrees, undermine both the values underly-
ing our system of government, as well as the long-term viability of the 
decision itself. 
A.  Defining Marriage by Federal Statute 
A federal statute defining marriage as including or excluding same-
sex couples for all purposes73 nationwide would clearly be at odds with 
the limited national legislative power feature  of the federal component 
of “our”  system of government and, for that reason, would likely be held 
unconstitutional.74 As noted above, the framers declined to give Congress 
 
 73. Federal law already regulates and shapes the marriage relationship in a number of indi-
rect ways. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (f) (2000) (marriage requirement for certain ERISA benefits); 
IRC § 6013 (2000) (altering federal income tax for married couples). See also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 
THE U.S. INCOME TAX: WHAT IT IS, HOW IT GOT THAT WAY, AND WHERE WE GO FROM HERE 29-
40 (1999) (describing how federal income tax laws encourage, or in many cases, discourage mar-
riage). However, most of these statutes do not provide a primary definition of marriage, instead rely-
ing on state law definitions. While the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 110 Stat. 
2419 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S. C. § 1738C; 1 U.S.C. § 7), does define marriage for 
purposes of federal law, that is still different from a federal statute which would supplant a state-law 
definition, or limit the choices available to a state. The desirability and constitutionality of the por-
tion of DOMA which defines marriage for federal law purposes is not within the scope of this arti-
cle, which focuses on the proper forum for defining marriage in its most basic form. For discussion 
of the issues raised by that portion of DOMA, see Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, Constitu-
tional and Legal Defects in the “Defense of Marriage” Act, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 221 (1996) (ar-
guing that Congress lacks the power to define marriage even for federal law purposes); Melissa 
Rothstein, The Defense of Marriage Act and Federalism: A States’ Rights Argument in Defense of 
Same-Sex Marriages, 31 FAM. L.Q. 571 (1997) (same); Andrew Koppleman, Dumb and DOMA: 
Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1997) (concluding 
that “Congress obviously has the power to define the terms of the U.S. Code,” but that DOMA is 
unconstitutionally discriminatory). 
 74. See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (“[T]here is no federal law of 
domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern.”); In re Burris, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 
(1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife . . . belongs to the laws of 
the states, and not to the laws of the United States”); United Ass’n of Journeymen Local 198 AFL-
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authority to make the kind of substantive value judgments required to 
decide what kinds of relationships should qualify as a marriage. More-
over, as noted above, there are good policy reasons why such contested 
value judgments should not be made by Congress at a national level. The 
decision would be made by elected representatives who are further re-
moved from their constituents—both geographically and numerically75—
than are state officials. Furthermore, definitively resolving the issue at 
the national level prevents the relatively easy exit that exists at the state 
level, and likely increases the number of persons who will feel alienated 
by the decision, potentially undermining the classic republican compo-
nents of our system. Thus, a congressional statute definitively resolving 
the issue would be inconsistent with both the federal and republican fea-
tures of “our” system of government. 
B.  U.S. Supreme Court Decision 
In the absence of a new constitutional amendment, the consistency 
with “our” system of government of a U.S. Supreme Court decision re-
solving the same-sex marriage issue would vary dramatically depending 
on the basis for the decision. If the decision were based on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, it would be much more consistent with “our” system of 
government than would an identical decision based on privacy or some 
other constitutional value judgment. 
 
CIO Pension Plan v. Myers, 488 F. Supp. 704, 707 (M.D. La. 1980) (“[T]he delicate relationships of 
husband-wife . . . are traditionally matters of exclusive state concern. No provision of Article I of the 
Constitution confers power upon the Congress to legislate in these sensitive state fields. Any general 
federal law attempting to regulate such relationships would be constitutionally infirm.”). But see 
Judith Resnik, “Naturally” Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1747 (1991) (concluding that, in light of the number of federal laws which 
affect and indirectly define family life, “the idea that family law belongs to the states becomes prob-
lematic”). For a thoughtful argument that state control of family is an essential aspect of a liberal 
democratic order, see Dailey, supra note 19. 
 75. Currently, each member of the U.S. House of Representatives represents approximately 
646,000 constituents (a figure derived by dividing the 2000 population of the U.S. (281,424,177, 
www.census.gov/population/cen2000/tab01.xls) by 435). U.S. Senators from the more populous 
states represent millions (in the case of California, 1 for every 16 million residents). By contrast, 
some state legislators represent a group less than 2% that size. Wyoming, for example, has a repre-
sentative for every 8,255 residents (60 state representatives representing 495,304 residents 
www.census.gov/population/cen2000/tab01.xls). Legislators in other states represent larger groups, 
but those groups are still a small fraction of the size of the groups represented in the U.S. Congress. 
Utah, for example, has a representative for every 29,823 residents (75 representatives, population of 
2,236,714 www.census.gov/population/cen2000/tab01.xls), and Hawaii has a representative for 
every 23,856 residents (51 representatives, population of 1,216,642 
www.census.gov/population/cen2000/tab01.xls). Even the larger states have constituents groups that 
are considerably smaller than those at the national level. New York, for example, has a representa-
tive for every 126,670 residents (150 representatives, population of 19,004,973 
www.census.gov/population/cen2000/tab01.xls). The chance that an elected representative will accu-
rately and fully represent her constituents obviously declines as the number of constituents increases. 
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An equal protection decision would arguably be consistent with all 
the premises of “our” system of government. While such a decision 
would clearly be based on a substantive value—equality—that value 
finds express mention in a constitutional amendment ratified by a suffi-
cient number of states to largely satisfy both the democratic and federal 
features of “our” system of government.76 Moreover, equality is a value 
norm which arguably is an essential feature of both the relatively value-
free classic liberalism philosophy77 and the more value-shaping philoso-
phy of classic republicanism.78 The main objection to such a ruling 
would, therefore, be that it might not comport with the democratic com-
ponent of “our” system because, while the people clearly inserted the 
general concept of equality into the constitution, in the absence of an 
amendment specifically addressing its application to same-sex marriage, 
it is less clear that they would want the equal protection clause applied in 
any particular manner on that issue.79 
On the other hand, a decision resolving the issue (likely in favor of 
same-sex marriage) on privacy grounds—which after Lawrence v. 
Texas,80 seems like the most likely alternative candidate—would argua-
bly violate the democratic principle of “our” system of government.  
Non-textual substantive value judgments made by governmental actors 
who are not elected representatives of the sovereign people run the risk 
of creating one kind of tyranny “our” system was designed to prevent—
extraneous creation and imposition of values. 
More importantly, a non-textual privacy based decision would poten-
tially violate the classic republican feature of “our” system by alienating 
 
 76. Even if the decision were otherwise contestable, it would be less violative of the democ-
ratic norm if based on equal protection grounds rather than on privacy or some other liberty type 
basis. As Justice Jackson explained, if a court strikes down substantive legislation on substantive due 
process or liberty grounds, the effect is frequently to disable “all government—state, municipal and 
federal—from dealing with the conduct,” thus leaving “ungoverned and ungovernable conduct 
which many people find objectionable.” Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). On the other hand, “[i]nvocation of the equal protection clause . . . 
does not disable any governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means that 
the prohibition or regulation must have a broader impact.” Id. Thus, an equal protection ruling will 
often still leave room for legislative choice by the people’s elected representatives. Moreover, this 
“democratic gain” is often achieved without any corresponding increase in the risk of majority tyr-
anny because “there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable gov-
ernment than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must 
be imposed generally.” Id. 
 77. See ELY, supra note 29, at 77-101. 
 78. See WOOD, supra note 25, at 70-75. 
 79. Some might also argue that such a decision would still run the risk of interfering with 
anti-alienation aspects of the classic republican features of “our” system of government. However, as 
noted below, see infra text at notes 81-82, that interference would likely be less than if the Court 
were to rule on other more clearly contested value judgment bases, such as privacy. 
 80. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
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from that system those who oppose the decision. Such alienation can 
well lead to withdrawal from the political process, or worse, to efforts to 
resolve the issue outside that process, as demonstrated by a similar non-
textual, value-based Supreme Court decision on the abortion issue.81 The 
impact on the classic republican features of our system could be espe-
cially harmful were the Court to base its decision on the assertion in 
Lawrence that a state cannot regulate a practice merely because “a gov-
erning majority in [the] State has traditionally viewed [it] as immoral,”82 
a statement seemingly at odds with the central premise of civic republi-
canism that government has a role to play in shaping and implementing 
shared moral principles. 
The alienation that could result from such a decision might adversely 
impact not only our system of government, but also the viability of the 
proposed resolution of the dispute itself. As the long-running post-Roe v. 
Wade83 controversy concerning abortion indicates, judicial resolution of 
value disputes at a national level may cause an issue to be more, not less, 
contentious in the long run.84 
Thus, the adverse impact on both “our” system of government and 
on the durability of the solution itself would vary dramatically depending 
on the basis for the judicial ruling, something proponents of such a solu-
tion should take into account. 
 
 81. See, e.g., Ron Word, Abortion Foe Executed for Slayings at Clinic, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 
4, 2003, at A5 (describing murders by abortion opponents and noting that one of them urged foes of 
abortion “to do what you have to do to stop it”). 
 82. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483 (quoting Stevens dissent in Bowers). 
 83. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 84. As Justice Scalia pointed out in Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey: 
Not only did Roe not, as the Court suggests, resolve the deeply divisive issue of abortion; 
it did more than anything else to nourish it, by elevating it to the national level where it is 
infinitely more difficult to resolve. National politics were not plagued by abortion pro-
tests, national abortion lobbying, or abortion marches on Congress before Roe v. Wade 
was decided. Profound disagreement existed among our citizens over the issue—as it 
does over other issues, such as the death penalty—but that disagreement was being 
worked out at the state level. As with many other issues, the division of sentiment within 
each State was not as closely balanced as it was among the population of the Nation as a 
whole, meaning not only that more people would be satisfied with the results of state-by-
state resolution, but also that those results would be more stable. Pre-Roe, moreover, po-
litical compromise was possible. Roe’s mandate for abortion on demand destroyed the 
compromises of the past, rendered compromise impossible for the future, and required 
the entire issue to be resolved uniformly, at the national level. At the same time, Roe cre-
ated a vast new class of abortion consumers and abortion proponents by eliminating the 
moral opprobrium that had attached to the act. (“If the Constitution guarantees abortion, 
how can it be bad?”—not an accurate line of thought, but a natural one.) Many favor all 
of those developments, and it is not for me to say that they are wrong. . . . Roe fanned 
into life an issue that has inflamed our national politics in general, and has obscured with 
its smoke the selection of Justices to this Court in particular, ever since. 
505 U.S. 833, 995-96 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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C. Federal Constitutional Amendment 
A federal constitutional amendment85 either legalizing or (more 
likely at the present time) prohibiting86 same-sex marriage would not as 
clearly undermine the structural principles of “our” system of govern-
ment as would a federal statute or a U.S. Supreme Court decision based 
on privacy or some other substantive value judgment. For just as clearly 
as the people limited congressional authority to the subjects expressly 
mentioned in the Constitution, they also authorized amendments—even 
amendments containing value judgments (as the presence of the Thir-
teenth87 and Eighteenth88 amendments demonstrates). Moreover, such an 
amendment would not, as a policy matter, be as violative of either the 
federal or republican features as would a federal statute, given that a con-
stitutional amendment requires the concurrence of three-quarters of the 
states, thereby ensuring more state participation and engendering less 
alienation of the citizenry. 
Similarly, that same majoritarian ratification process would render a 
solution by federal constitutional amendment less violative of the democ-
ratic feature of “our” government than would a judicial decision. Thus, 
of the national solutions, a federal constitutional amendment appears to 
be the best,89 at least when measured by the extent to which it complies 
 
 85. This section addresses federal constitutional amendments which would provide a nation-
wide constitutional definition of marriage.  See, e.g., SJ30, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced March 
22, 2004) (proposal to add to the U.S. Constitution a provision stating, “Marriage in the United 
States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the con-
stitution of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be 
conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman.”). 
A federal constitutional amendment which, rather than establish a national definition of marriage, 
sets forth the form and forum in which the issue would be resolved, see, e.g., A Battle, Joined Mar-
riage and the Constitution. National Review, March 22, 2004 (discussing proposal by Senator Orrin 
Hatch to amend the constitution to provide that “Civil marriage shall be defined in each state by the 
legislature or the citizens thereof. Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to require that mar-
riage or its benefits be extended to any union other than that of a man and a woman”) would be 
much more compatible with the salient features of “our” system of government, especially if it pro-
moted resolution of the issue by either a state statute or constitutional amendment, the two forms 
most compatible with the norms of “our” system. See note 133 infra. 
 86. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong. (2004); H.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003); S.J. Res. 26, 
108th Cong., (2003). 
 87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (prohibiting slavery). 
 88. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (outlawing manufacture, sale, and transportation of intoxicat-
ing liquors for beverages). 
 89. As noted above, a U.S. Supreme Court decision based on the Equal Protection Clause 
might arguably comport with most of the essential features of our system as well as a federal consti-
tutional amendment. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79. The difference is that the tension 
with the “democratic” feature of the system which a judicial decision based on the general notion of 
equality might engender would be alleviated if the decision were made by a constitutional amend-
ment specifically addressing the issue. 
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with the key premises of “our democratic, federal, republican” system of 
government. 
Still, resolving the issue by federal constitutional amendment would 
run counter to some of the classic republican features underlying that 
system in ways that could undermine both those norms, as well as the 
long-term viability of the attempted solution. Our nation’s experience 
with constitutionally-imposed prohibition demonstrates how this could 
occur. 
The constitutional amendment outlawing alcoholic beverages 
throughout the country90 was at base a value judgment driven in part by 
the belief that abstinence from alcohol was essential to the enjoyment of 
“life in the whole, the good, and the beautiful.”91 As evidenced by the 
passage of the amendment, there was at least superficial super-
majoritarian support for this vision of the good life. Yet, there was not a 
sufficient level of support to induce the kind of voluntary observance of 
the law that is required in a free republic. As a result, federal enforce-
ment efforts increased dramatically,92 further alienating many from the 
federal government.93 And ultimately, without local community support 
in several areas,94 the experiment failed, notwithstanding the apparent na-
 
 90. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. 
 91. J. H. TIMBERLAKE, PROHIBITION AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 34 (1963) (quoting 
Charles F. Aked, Man and His Neighbor, APPLETON’S MAGAZINE, July 1908, at 12:9). While much 
of the support for the temperance movement came from religious entities, see ANDREW SINCLAIR, 
PROHIBITION: THE ERA OF EXCESS 63-81 (1962), businesses and labor organizations were also in-
volved because of their belief that sobriety expanded productivity, TIMBERLAKE, supra, at 66-68, 
and worker well-being, id. at 83. During World War I, temperance was also linked to patriotism.  See 
P. H. ODEGARD, PRESSURE POLITICS: THE STORY OF THE ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE 71 (1928) (“Liquor 
is a menace to patriotism because it puts beer before country”) (quoting Wayne Wheeler, 
MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, Oct. 3, 1917). 
 92. A presidentially-appointed commission, chaired by former Attorney General George 
Wickersham, noted in 1931 that “[t]here has been more sustained pressure to enforce this law than 
on the whole has been true of any other federal statute” and that “[n]o other federal law has had such 
elaborate state and federal enforcing machinery put behind it.” WICKERSHAM COMM’N, REPORT ON 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 71-722 
(1931) [hereinafter “WICKERSHAM COMM’N”]. Yet, that same commission concluded that “in-
creased personnel and equipment are needed if enforcement agencies are to cope.” Id. at 37. 
 93. The Wickersham Commission observed that overzealous attempts to enforce prohibition 
backfired in many locations. “High-handed methods, shootings, and killings, even where justified, 
alienated thoughtful citizens, believers in law and order.” WICKERSHAM COMM’N, supra note 92, at 
46. See also, id. at 54 (“Many who are normally law-abiding are led to an attitude hostile to the stat-
ute by a feeling that repression and interference with private conduct are carried too far.”). 
 94. The Wickersham Commission noted that the root cause of the lack of enforcement was 
“the attitude of at least a very large number of respectable citizens in most of our large cities and in 
several states.” WICKERSHAM COMM’N, supra note 92, at 79. Elaborating, the Commission ex-
plained: “[A]dverse public opinion in some states and lukewarm public opinion with strong hostile 
elements in other states are obstinate facts which can not be coerced by any measure of enforcement 
tolerable under our polity.” Id. at 49. 
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tionwide support for the proposition.95 As one scholar concluded, one 
lesson from the experience is that liquor control cannot succeed without 
approval of the local communities.96 It appears to be the kind of moral 
decision97 that is best solved at a state or local level. By 1933, the vast 
majority of Americans apparently agreed with this conclusion, for the 
twenty-first amendment not only repealed the eighteenth, it also ex-
pressly (though awkwardly)98 made clear that states have more control 
over the issue than they previously had,99 seemingly sending a discourag-
ing message to any who might wish to revive the national experiment 
through normal legislative means. 
 
 95. “At the time of the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, thirty-three states had 
adopted prohibition by law or constitution; after the Eighteenth Amendment, twelve other states en-
acted prohibition.” WICKERSHAM COMM’N, supra note 92, at 39. Thus, citizens of forty-five of the 
forty eight states had adopted a state policy consistent with the national norm that proved to be a 
failure. 
 96. Sidney J. Spaeth, Comment, The Twenty-First Amendment and State Control over Intoxi-
cating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L. REV.161, 165 (1991) (“If any lesson 
can be learned from Prohibition, it is that liquor . . . cannot be subject to central planning. No system 
of liquor control has succeeded without the approval of the community.”). 
 97. The contested issue of whether morals is involved often only exacerbates the problem.  
As the Wickersham Commission observed about prohibition, “[a] considerable part of the public 
were irritated at a constitutional ‘don’t’ in a matter where they saw no moral question.” 
WICKERSHAM COMM’N, supra note 92, at 54. 
 98. The operative language provides: “The transportation or importation into any State, Terri-
tory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation 
of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” As Professor Tribe has pointed out, while the provision 
was designed to authorize states to regulate private conduct with respect to liquor, the text seems to 
directly prohibit that conduct itself, rather than to authorize states to do so. Laurence H. Tribe, How 
to Violate the Constitution Without Really Trying: Lessons from the Repeal of Prohibition to the 
Balanced Budget Amendment, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 217, 219 (1995). 
 99. The exact extent to which the Twenty-first Amendment shields state liquor policy from 
federal control is far from clear, see, e.g, Calif. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980) (noting that prior decisions “demonstrate that there is no bright line 
between federal and state powers over liquor” and that “competing state and federal interests can be 
reconciled only after careful scrutiny of those concerns in a ‘concrete case’”) (quoting Hostetter v. 
Idelwild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp,  377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964)), but the Supreme Court has made 
clear that, at minimum, it gives states greater leeway to regulate than they had before the amend-
ment, see, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 433 (1990) (“Given the special protec-
tion afforded to state liquor policies by the Twenty-first Amendment, they are supported by a strong 
presumption of validity and should not be set aside lightly.”); California Retail, 445 U.S. at 110 
(“The Twenty-first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control over whether to permit 
importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system”). See John Foust, 
Note, State Power to Regulate Alcohol Under the Twenty-First Amendment: The Constitutional Im-
plications of the Twenty-First Amendment Enforcement Act, 41 B.C. L. REV. 659, 680-88 (2000) 
(describing current Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence and concluding that state law would be 
immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny only if it is “designed to promote temperance and [is] real-
istically designed to achieve that goal”); Matthew J. Patterson, Note, A Brewing Debate: Alcohol, 
Direct Shipment Laws and the Twenty-First Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 761 (reviewing the 
history of the Twenty-first Amendment and subsequent case law and arguing for a broader view of 
state powers). 
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This less-than-successful experience with placing a value judgment 
in the federal constitution ought to give some pause to those who view 
this as the optimum method to resolve the same-sex marriage issue, par-
ticularly because it was a failure that could have been forecast by those 
who understood the classic republican insight that in a free society, 
laws—especially those regulating lifestyle—must enjoy sufficient sup-
port to induce widespread voluntary compliance and that such support is 
much more likely to exist when the decision is made at a more local 
level. 
Some may object to the prohibition analogy as inapt because en-
forcement of a ban on same-sex marriage (which can be effectuated 
through the simple expedient of refusing to grant the marriage license) 
will be much easier than was the ban on alcohol (which required affirma-
tive intrusion into residences and other private places). While enforce-
ment would undoubtedly be easier if same-sex marriage were the forbid-
den activity,100 unenforceability was a symptom and product of the core 
problem with prohibition—alienation from government—not the core 
problem itself. Thus, the Wickersham Commission concluded that en-
forcement was a problem not because of the private nature of the con-
duct, but because of lack of support. It noted that drug laws were largely 
enforceable even though they were enforced through largely the same 
measures as were the prohibition laws.101 The core problem was that 
people in many areas did not support the rule102—and lack of support 
was not just a cause of the enforceability problem, but also a problem in 
and of itself.103 Moreover (and more relevant to the current discussion), 
 
 100. Enforcement of a nationwide ban on same sex marriages may not be as simple as at first 
appears, particularly if there are state or local governmental officials who feel strongly enough about 
the issue to issue licenses in apparent violation of law.  See, e.g., SF City Hall is Marriage Central, 
S.F. CHRON., Feb. 16, 2004, at B3 (reporting that mayor issued licences to same-sex couple despite 
state statute defining marriage as between a man and a woman); Toby Smith, Gay Wedding Bliss, 
Blues, ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 21, 2004, at A1 (reporting that marriage licenses were issued to same-
sex couples by Sandoval County in New Mexico until intervention by state attorney general). 
 101. WICKERSHAM COMM’N, supra note 92, at 79-80. The Commission noted that “[t]he 
means of detecting transportation [of drugs] are more easily evaded than in the case of liquor. Yet 
there are no difficulties in the case of narcotics beyond those involved in the nature of the traffic 
because the laws against them are supported everywhere by a general and determined public senti-
ment.” Id. at 80. 
 102. The Wickersham Commission observed, “that under any system of reasonably free gov-
ernment a law will be observed and may be enforced only where and to the extent that it reflects or is 
an expression of the general opinion of the normally law-abiding elements of the community. To the 
extent that this is the case, the law will be observed by the great body of the people and may rea-
sonably be enforced as to the remainder.” Id. at 49. Thus, it was not the private nature of the con-
duct, but “[t]he state of public opinion, certainly in many important portions of the country,” which 
“present[ed] a serious obstacle to the observance and enforcement of the national prohibition laws.” 
Id. 
 103. “It is . . . a serious impairment of the legal order to have a national law upon the books 
theoretically governing the whole land and announcing a policy for the whole land which public 
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the core problem was exacerbated by the fact that the decision was made 
at a national level.104 
Finally, experience more directly relevant to the same sex marriage 
debate further indicates that even when enforcement of value judgments 
made by the more remote federal government can eventually be secured 
with enough effort, it may produce considerable (and perhaps unaccept-
able) feelings of government alienation on the part of those who disagree 
with the vision of the good life set forth in that judgment.  In the mid to 
late nineteenth century, the federal government—with widespread popu-
lar support outside the affected area—defined marriage to outlaw the re-
ligious-based practice of polygamy among the members of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in federal territories105 (including the 
Utah territory where most members of the LDS Church resided). While 
the law was eventually enforced with enough success that the Church 
changed its position,106 the resulting resentment toward the federal gov-
ernment among LDS members at the time was far from insignificant.107 
One gets the sense from some statements and attitudes of citizens of the 
Utah Territory at the time that there was little of the kind of civic or pub-
lic virtue toward the federal government which the framers thought es-
sential to a healthy democratic republic.108 Indeed, many of them chose 
 
opinion in many important centers will not enforce and in many others will not suffer to be enforced 
effectively. The injury to our legal and political institutions from such a situation must be weighed 
against the gains achieved.” Id. 
 104. Id. at 54 (noting that hostile attitude toward prohibition was “aggravated in many of the 
larger cities by a feeling that other parts of the land are seeking to impose ideas of conduct upon 
them”). 
 105. Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862). 
 106. In 1890, the President of the LDS Church, Wilford Woodruff, issued a manifesto noting 
that “[i]nasmuch as laws have been enacted by Congress forbidding plural marriages, which laws 
have been pronounced constitutional by the court of last resort, I hereby declare my intention to 
submit to those laws and . . . publicly declare that my advice to the Latter-day Saints is to refrain 
from contracting any marriage forbidden by the law of the land.” Official Declaration—1, THE 
DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 291-92. 
President Woodruff indicated that the decision was the result of divine revelation, rather than mere 
acquiescence. Id. at 292 (“I want to say this: I should have let all the temples go out of our hands; I 
should have gone to prison myself, and let every other man go there, had not the God of heaven 
commanded me to do what I did do: and when the hour came that I was commanded to do that; it 
was all clear to me. I went before the Lord, and I wrote what the Lord told me to write.”). 
 107. There was also some resentment by some non-LDS outside observers who questioned the 
cost (both in dollars and time and effort) of enforcing the ban on polygamy. One California newspa-
per at the time noted that “[t]he Government has enough fighting now on its hands and there is no 
necessity of increasing it.” 2 ORSON F. WHITNEY, HISTORY OF UTAH 99 (1893) (quoting DAILY 
ALTA CALIFORNIA, Mar. 11, 1863). Another opined that while “[t]he Mormons should, of course, 
submit to the laws . . . laws ought not be forced upon them which are repugnant to a very large ma-
jority of that singular people. . . . The pretty-much let-alone policy is the one which should be 
adopted.” Id. (quoting SACRAMENTO DAILY UNION, Mar. 12, 1863). 
 108. Evoking an attitude completely at odds with the kind of public virtue that engenders vol-
untary compliance with the law, one Latter-day Saint woman of the time proclaimed: “If the rulers 
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to leave the country and forfeit many of the benefits of citizenship.109 
Again, those advocating a federal constitutional solution to the same-sex 
marriage controversy should, at a minimum, consider the possibility that 
there will be similar costs to the structure from such an effort.110 
Thus, while having a lesser impact on our system of government 
than the other two potential forms of resolving the issue on a national 
level, a federal constitutional solution would still not appear to be the op-
timum solution; at a minimum, it would impose real costs which should 
be considered before such a step is taken. 
D. State Supreme Court Decision 
As with a U.S. Supreme Court decision, the compatibility of a state 
supreme court decision resolving the same-sex marriage issue with “our” 
system of government depends in part on the grounds on which the deci-
sion rests. An equality-based ruling is likely to be less disruptive to the 
democratic feature of “our” system than a substantive value-based deci-
 
of our nation will so far depart from the spirit and letter of our glorious Constitution as to deprive 
our prophets, apostles, and elders of citizenship, and imprison them for obeying this law, let them 
grant us this last request, to make their prisons large enough to hold their wives for where they go we 
will go also.” DESERET NEWS, Jan. 15, 1870 at 2 (quoting Phoebe Woodruff), quoted in GUSTIVE O. 
LARSON, THE “AMERICANIZATION” OF UTAH FOR STATEHOOD 67-68 (1971). As one scholar has 
observed, by the time Utah became a state “the Mormons had come to resent and distrust the [federal 
territorial] government, which had generally tolerated and sometimes aided and fostered the violent 
depredations committed against them.” L. Rex Sears, Punishing the Saints for Their “Peculiar Insti-
tution”: Congress on the Constitutional Dilemmas, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 581, 585 (2001). 
 109. See RICHARD S. VAN WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY: A HISTORY 125-26 (2d ed. 
1989) (describing movement of hundreds of LDS church members from the Utah territory into Mex-
ico and Canada). 
 110. Experience with the one other clear value judgment in the constitution—the prohibition 
against slavery—also indicates that such judgments come at a high cost (in this case, the cost of a 
civil war). This is not to question the wisdom of the Thirteenth Amendment. Whatever the cost, it 
was a necessary and worthwhile national solution. Advocates of a national constitutional solution to 
the same-sex marriage issue should, however, consider whether the issue rises to the same level of 
importance as slavery and whether the costs—even though likely less than that of a civil war—are 
sufficiently offset by the benefits. 
The decision to enshrine the anti-slavery value judgment in the largely value-neutral federal consti-
tution might also be explained on other grounds that distinguish it from a federal constitutional 
amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage. Abraham Lincoln, for one, viewed slavery as inconsis-
tent with the principle of self-government that underlies our entire system of government. See 2 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 247-83 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (“When the white 
man governs himself that is self-government; but when he governs himself, and also governs another 
man . . . that is despotism. . . . . [W]e began by declaring that all men are created equal; but now 
from that beginning we have run down to the other declaration, that for some men to enslave others 
is a ‘sacred right of self-government.”  These principles cannot stand together. . . . . Let us re-adopt 
the Declaration of Independence, and with it, the practices, and policy which harmonize it.”). Thus, 
the Thirteenth Amendment can be viewed as a “structural” reinforcing provision of the constitution. 
Given the current nature of the same-sex marriage debate, a provision prohibiting same-sex marriage 
seems less obviously so. But see supra note 11. 
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sion.111 However, differences in the nature of both the constitutions they 
definitively interpret and the structure in which they operate distinguish 
state supreme courts from their federal counterparts in ways that make a 
state supreme court ruling on the issue easier to square with the funda-
mental components of “our” system of government. 
That definitive resolution by a state supreme court would involve in-
terpretation of a state, rather than the federal,112 constitution is significant 
in terms of its compatibility with both the democratic and the classic re-
publican features of “our” system of government. Such a decision would 
be more “democratic” than one by the U.S. Supreme Court because citi-
zens have a more direct impact on the content of state constitutions113 
than they do on the content of the national constitution. This enhanced 
democratic control is heightened even further in many states by differ-
ences in the way justices are selected and retained at the state level.114 In 
many states, justices face periodic retention elections,115 and in some di-
rect elections determine the membership of the court.116 While this does 
not automatically render the justices representatives of the people in the 
same sense that legislators are,117 it makes decisions by such courts more 
consistent with democratic values underlying our system of government. 
 
 111. See supra note 76. 
 112. While it is possible that a state supreme court could resolve the definitional dispute on 
federal constitutional grounds, such a ruling would be subject to review by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Thus, this article does not address the consequences of a state supreme court ruling on federal 
grounds. 
 113. As Alan Tarr has explained, “Whereas the federal amendment process provides no 
mechanism for direct popular participation, the states have structured the process of constitutional 
change to maximize such participation.” TARR, supra note 47, at 25. Not only do some states permit 
constitutional amendments to be initiated by the people, some allow the people to call constitutional 
conventions, and all but one require that any amendment be ratified by the people.  Id. at 25-26. In-
creased citizen control also stems from the smaller population base by which the decision is made 
(thereby increasing the relative influence of any one citizen). 
 114. According to one recent survey, there are only eleven states in which judges are “never 
subjected to election at any time in their judicial careers.” Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, 
Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capi-
tal Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 776 (1995). 
 115. In thirteen states, judges face periodic retention elections which are uncontested.  Bright 
& Keenan, supra note 114, at 778. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 16; FLA. CONST. art 5, §10; MD. 
CONST. art IV, § 5A; UTAH CONST. art. VIII, §§ 8-9. 
 116. Judges in twenty-nine states face contested elections at some time in their careers.  Bright 
& Keenan, supra note 114, at 777. In many, initial selection and retention is determined by contested 
elections. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.13; LA. CONST. art. 5, § 22; NEV. CONST. art 6, §§ 
3, 5; TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3-4; TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 2, 4, 6, 7. 
 117. See Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 455 (M.D. La. 1972), aff’d, 409 U.S. 1095 
(1973) (holding that election of state supreme court justices in Louisiana are not subject to the one-
vote, one-person requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment because “[j]udges do not represent peo-
ple, they serve people”) (quoting Buchanan v. Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860, 865 (N.D. Ohio 1966). But 
see Chishom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (holding those same justices were “representatives” 
for purposes of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). 
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Differences between the federal and state constitutions also make it 
less likely that a state supreme court decision resolving the same-sex 
marriage dispute would undermine the classic republican norms of our 
system than would a U.S. Supreme Court decision. As noted above,118 
“our” system contemplates that decisions at the state level may be, in-
deed perhaps must be, more value-laden than those at the national level, 
and that assumption is borne out in the language of many state constitu-
tions.119 Because those constitutions can be more value-laden than their 
federal counterpart under our system of government—and because citi-
zens of a state have much more input in determining the content of those 
constitutions120—the sense of alienation from the system by those who 
oppose the decision is likely to be much less if the decision is based on 
state rather than the federal constitution. 
That opponents of the decision would be less alienated from the sys-
tem if the decision were made by a state supreme court, rather than the 
U.S. Supreme Court is made even more likely by the different geo-
graphic reach of decisions by the two courts. Since the state court deci-
sion’s impact would, as an initial matter,121 be limited to one state, those 
who disagreed with the decision to such an extent that they could no 
longer be fully responsible participants in the state system could exit that 
part without severing their links to the overall national system. 
 
 118. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51. 
 119. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art III., § 20 (setting forth state position on gambling); DEL. 
CONST. art. 2, § 17 (same); KAN. CONST. art 15, § 10 (setting forth state policy on sale of liquor); 
ALA. CONST. amend. 688 (prohibiting prostitution in certain parts of the state). 
 120. See supra note 113. 
 121. If a state supreme court decision had nationwide impact—through application of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, or some other choice of law doctrine—the alien-
ation of the decision’s opponents would increase dramatically and alter the relative position of a 
state supreme court and a U.S. Supreme Court decision in that respect. A citizen is much more likely 
to feel alienated from government in ways that undermine the critical civic republican features of our 
system if the decision she opposes comes from a (state) court over which she has no control inter-
preting a value-laden (state constitutional) document on whose content she has no input than if it 
came from a (U.S.) court over which she has some—though indirect—control, interpreting a docu-
ment that is generally speaking more value-neutral, see supra text at notes 28-32, and whose content 
she has more influence over. Thus, while this article does not address the widely-debated issue of 
whether one state should, or must, recognize marriages performed in other states, see, e.g., Linda J. 
Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii Bind the World? A Comment on Same-Sex Marriage and Fed-
eralism Values, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 191 (1996); Michael J. Solimine, Competitive Federalism 
and Interstate Recognition of Marriage, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV, 83 (1998); Andrew Koppleman, 
Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921 (1998); Scott Frue-
hawld, Choice of Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 51 FLA. L. REV. 799 (1999); Larry Kramer, Same-
Sex Marriage, Conflicts of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 
1965 (1997); Andrew Koppleman, supra note 73; Timothy Joseph Keefer, Note, DOMA as a Defen-
sible Exercise of Congressional Power Under the Full-Faith-And-Credit Clause, 53 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1635 (1997), analysis of that issue in light of the components of “our democratic, federal, 
republican” system suggests that the answer to that question should be negative. 
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Thus, a state supreme court decision resolving the same-sex marriage 
issue for a particular state would have markedly less adverse impact on 
the key components of our governmental system than would a corre-
sponding decision of nationwide impact by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Still, there would be some tension between such a decision and the de-
mocratic components of that system (especially in the majority of states 
where judges are not elected directly), tensions that would be lessened if 
the decision were made by state constitutional amendment or state legis-
lation. 
E. State Statute 
Resolution of the same-sex marriage debate by state statute122 is, in 
terms of compatibility with the key features of “our democratic, federal 
republican” system, preferable to each of the other four forms discussed 
thus far because a state statutory resolution of the issue does not suffer 
any of the potential defects that render the others somewhat suspect. 
Unlike a federal statute, which runs afoul of the limited powers feature of 
the federal component of our system, a state statute would not be beyond 
the jurisdictional authority of the enacting body since state legislatures 
have plenary authority.123 Unlike a state or federal supreme court deci-
sion, such a statute could not be criticized as anti-democratic because it 
would be enacted by the duly elected representatives of the people. Fi-
nally, since it is enacted at a level at which participation and influence 
are relatively greater and exit is relatively easier, a state statutory resolu-
tion of the issue does not carry with it the same alienation potential 
which a federal constitutional amendment or U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion might create. State statutory resolution of the issue, therefore, 
emerges as one of the prime contenders for the best form for resolving 
the same-sex marriage issue. The only question is whether it is preferable 
to a state constitutional amendment. 
F. State Constitutional Amendment 
Like a state statutory resolution, a state constitutional amendment di-
rectly addressing the same-sex marriage issue appears to be preferable to 
the first four forms addressed in this article. Such a state constitutional 
 
 122. In many states, including some where state constitutional amendments cannot be gener-
ated through the initiative process, state legislation can be enacted through that process. See, e.g., 
UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20A-7-201 to 20A-7-213. Such legislative resolu-
tion of the issues presents the same problems posed by constitutional amendments adopted through 
that same means. See infra text at notes 127-30. The analysis in the text addresses only legislation 
adopted by the state legislature. 
 123. See supra note 51. 
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amendment would clearly be more compatible with all the components 
of our system of government than would a similar federal constitutional 
amendment (the federal form that is most compatible with “our” system 
of government). The increased input into the decision that citizens have 
at the state level,124 coupled with their increased opportunity for exit,125 
considerably lessen the adverse impact on the anti-alienation aspects of 
the classic republican features of our system, the one aspect of a federal 
constitutional amendment that is most in tension with “our” form of gov-
ernment. 
Such a resolution would also appear to be better than a state supreme 
court decision resolving the issue through the application of a provision 
less directly addressing the issue. A state constitutional amendment 
would not only be more democratic than a judicial decision, but the in-
creased citizen input involved in the amendment process would also di-
minish the adverse impact on the anti-alienation features  of classic re-
publicanism, even for those who oppose the ultimate decision. 
Resolution of the issue through state constitutional amendment is, 
therefore, like state statutory resolution, a prime candidate for the best 
form of resolution in our democratic, federal republic (at least in terms of 
its consistency with the fundamental norms of that system). However, 
whether it is arguably the best, or arguably one of the worst, depends on 
the exact method by which the constitutional amendment occurs. 
In some states, constitutional amendments can occur through the ini-
tiative process whereby citizens place before the voters an amendment 
which has been drafted completely outside the legislative process.126 An 
amendment which bypasses the elected representatives in the lawmaking 
process potentially violates the first republican component of “our” sys-
tem, which favors representative, rather than purely democratic, resolu-
tion of policy decisions.127 Indeed, the reasons given by the framers for 
favoring such representative form of government—including its ten-
dency to prevent the tyranny of the majority feared by many of the fram-
ers—apply with particular force to state constitutional amendments 
adopted through the initiative process, as several scholars have demon-
strated.128 As these scholars have shown, use of the initiative process to 
 
 124. See supra note 113. 
 125. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57. 
 126. Eighteen states permit constitutional amendments to be initiated by the people. TARR, 
supra note 47, at 25. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a); COLO. CONST. art. 5, § 1(1); MO. CONST. 
art. III, § 50; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. IXX, § 2(1); OK. CONST. art. 24, § 3. 
 127. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44. 
 128. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1513-
48 (1990); Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency 
Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-05 (2003). 
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by-pass state legislatures could lead to one of the very forms of tyranny 
that our democratic, federal republican system is designed to prevent.129 
The potential extent of the undermining is such that a credible argument 
can be made that amending the state constitution through the initiative 
process violates the clause of the constitution guaranteeing to the states a 
“republican” form of government.130 Thus, resolving the same-sex mar-
riage issue through the initiative form of state constitutional amendment 
may arguably be as inimical to our system of government as any other 
form, joining federal legislation as the only form to which serious consti-
tutional arguments could be raised. 
On the other hand, constitutional amendments which originate in the 
state legislature, especially those which require the assent of a super-
majority of each house of the legislature,131 not only avoid the “anti-
republican” vices of initiative-generated constitutional amendments, they 
are arguably the form of resolution most compatible with all the features 
of “our democratic, federal republican” form of government. By passing 
the decision through the representative filtering process, such an amend-
ment clearly comports with the representative republican principle. By 
requiring subsequent approval of a majority of voters, who are then free 
to exit the system if they oppose the decision strongly enough, it also 
complies with the classic republican features of “our” system. Majority 
approval by ballot also comports with the democratic feature of the sys-
tem, by ensuring that no value is inserted into law without consent of the 
governed. Finally, because it is made at the state level, where value-laden 
decisions are more permissible, it comports fully with the two more tra-
ditional features132 of the federal component of our system. 
Thus, the only remaining issue is whether a non-initiative generated 
state constitutional amendment is preferable to a state statutory solu-
 
 129. Staszewski, supra note 128, at 401-03; Eule, supra note 128, at 1525. 
 130. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. See Hans J. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republi-
can Government”: The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19 (1993). As Justice 
Linde observed, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that disputes under the Guarantee Clause are 
not justiciable, at least in federal courts. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).  
However, that Court has not ruled on whether the state courts can enforce the provision, and some 
state courts have found such claims justiciable. See, e.g., In re Interrogatories, 536 P.2d 308 (Colo. 
1975); VanSickle v. Shanahan, 511 P.2d 223 (Kan. 1973). But see State ex rel. Huddleston v. Saw-
yer, 932 P.2d 1145 (Or. 1997) (holding Guaranty Clause claims non-justiciable in state courts); Mi-
chael C. Dorf, The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS 
U. L. REV. 51, 59-67 (1998) (concluding that the justiciability of the Guarantee Clause in state courts 
is an open question, with good arguments available on both sides of the issue). 
 131. See, e.g., UTAH CONST. art. XXIII. 
 132. See supra note 37 (defining “federal” component of our system as including horizontal 
separation of powers). 
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tion.133 That is a close question that could go either way. On one hand, a 
state constitutional amendment of the proper type does more to enhance 
both the democratic and civic republican features of “our” system of 
government than does a state statute because the people are more directly 
involved in the process, and it would provide these benefits without in-
terfering in any way with the representative-based feature of republican-
ism. 
On the other hand, a state constitutional amendment is somewhat less 
compatible than a state statute with the “horizontal” separation of powers 
feature of the federal component of “our” system because it would be 
subject to less judicial scrutiny than would a comparable state statute. 
While the federal judiciary would be available to ensure that the resulting 
decision did not violate federal constitutional norms if the decision were 
made by either a state statute or a state constitutional provision, there 
would be no meaningful role for the state judiciary to play if a state con-
stitutional amendment definitively resolved the issue in a specific way.134 
If the same-sex marriage issue were resolved by a state statute, state 
courts would be permitted to determine whether the statute complied 
with other provisions of the state constitution, and this would provide a 
“double judicial security” of its own to ensure that the decision accu-
rately represented the full vision of the good life which the state constitu-
tion embodies and not just the temporary inflamed passion of the major-
ity. 
Thus, whether a state statute or a state constitutional amendment is 
the best form of resolution is itself dependent on a value choice: which 
tyranny-combating feature of our system is more important—the hori-
zontal feature of the federal component (which favors the state statute), 
or the democratic and classic republican components (which favors the 
state constitutional amendment)? Recognizing that the matter could go 
either way, I prefer the latter in this case for both practical and theoretical 
reasons. 
 
 133. A federal constitutional amendment which required that marriage be defined by state leg-
islatures or the people of the state, see supra text accompanying note 85, might arguably be the best 
option since it would require that one of these two most preferable methods be used, without speci-
fying which one. 
 134. Obviously, state courts would have jurisdiction to review the federal constitutionality of 
the state constitutional amendment, but ultimate judicial review authority would be exercised by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. See supra note 112. Moreover, while the state courts would be involved in the 
interpretive process with a state constitutional amendment, if the amendment were drafted in a care-
ful way, that role would be nearly meaningless with respect to resolution of the core issue—whether 
same-sex relationships should be legally recognized as marriages. More importantly, the court would 
play that same role (broad or narrow though it may be) if the decision were made by state statute. 
What would be missing in the case of a state constitutional amendment is review for compliance 
with other provisions of the state constitution. 
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As a practical matter, recent experience has demonstrated that state 
court judicial review of state statutes can too easily lead to judicial reso-
lution of the issue contrary to the will of the people and the legislature.135 
At least some state court judges appear to be too eager to the resolve the 
issue for themselves, without a careful consideration of their proper role 
in the system. The risk of tyranny of the judiciary is therefore somewhat 
high on such an impassioned issue. This, in turn, lessens the net benefit 
of a “double” judicial security. 
More importantly, as a theoretical matter, in our system, the ultimate 
sovereign who must remain responsible for whatever acts the govern-
ment takes is the people.136 While there are filters though which the peo-
ple’s judgment must pass before it is properly implemented in our sys-
tem, in the long run, it is their judgment, not that of the judiciary, which 
should control. If a state constitutional amendment were adopted through 
the non-initiative process, the people’s judgment would have passed 
through the requisite filters, and federal judicial review would be avail-
able to further ensure that other more process-oriented norms were not 
violated. Thus, while a proponent of “our democratic, federal, republi-
can” form of government might be persuaded either way on the matter, 
this particular proponent concludes that the optimum form of resolution 
of the same-sex marriage issue is to specifically address the issue 
through a non-initiative generated state constitutional amendment.137 
 
 135. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) and Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statis-
tics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998), and constitutional 
amendments made in response, HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25, and supra 
note 2.  See also, Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (prompting ef-
forts to amend the state constitution); Yvonne Abraham, Gay-Marriage Foes Aim for Double Ban on 
‘08 Ballot, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 20, 2004, at B1. 
 136. See THE FEDERALIST No. 31 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 137. An alternative optimum solution might be a “properly” adopted state constitutional 
amendment similar to that adopted by initiative in Hawaii, see HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23, which vests 
exclusive state power over the definition of marriage in the state legislature. Such a solution would 
have all the advantages of a “properly” initiated state constitution without enshrining the definition 
of marriage into the state constitution, thereby leaving the matter open for easier democratic change 
in the future. While some might prefer such a solution on the grounds that “attempts to freeze sub-
stantive values do not belong in the constitution,” ELY, supra note 29, at 99, that argument has more 
validity for the relatively value-neutral federal constitution (which is the document to which Ely’s 
comments were directed), than the more value-laden state constitutions. Thus, the preferability vel 
non of such an amendment over a state constitutional amendment which directly defined marriage 
might depend largely on one’s views on the “correctness” of the constitutional definition. If one 
agreed with the definition, one might likely prefer to have it enshrined in the constitution, where it 
would be more difficult to change. One who disagreed with the definition would likely prefer a more 
easily modifiable definition. 
10 WORTHEN.MACRO 5/25/2004  11:30 PM 
273] WHO DECIDES? 307 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The passion demonstrated by both sides of the same-sex marriage 
debate is unlikely to dissipate as the definitive decisions are made. Un-
fortunately, that passion may cause those involved to lose sight of other 
equally important issues, such as the impact the decision may have on 
our system of government. Reminding ourselves of the fundamental 
principles on which that system is constructed does not necessarily shed 
light on the proper outcome of the debate. It does, however, underscore 
that more is at stake in the debate than just the future definition of mar-
riage, as important as that may be. In the long run, how and where such a 
decision is made may be just as important to our future society as what 
that exact decision is. Focusing on the proper form and forum issue may 
also serve to make the resulting decision both more sustainable and more 
tolerable for those who disagree with it. One may hope that those in-
volved in the substantive debate will as carefully consider these matters 
as they do the merits of the contested issue as the debate continues. 
